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ABSTRACT: The literature on catching-up based growth has developed mainly in isolation of 
other theories on technology and economic growth. This paper presents an industry-level 
technology gap model in which evolving specialization patterns are the endogenous result of 
innovation, international technology diffusion, learning-by-doing and balance-of-payments 
restricted growth. Differences between sectors with regard to their share in consumption are 
shown to reinforce or mitigate the effects of specialization on aggregate productivity convergence 
patterns, depending on other parameters. The implications of the model are studied by means of 
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1The Evolution of Productivity Gaps and 
Specialization Patterns  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The productivity growth performance of countries has always been of central interest to 
economists. Over time, many theories about the sources of growth have been proposed, tested 
and refined. In most theories, technological progress emerges as the engine of growth. These 
theories vary widely, however, with regard to the specific ways in which technology affects 
economic growth. In general, three sources of technological progress at the national level are 
discerned: innovation, catching-up and learning-by-doing. 
Most theoretical models focus on a single source of growth, which renders their outcomes of 
limited relevance. The vast majority of empirical studies also provide analyses that relate 
differences in growth performances between countries to differences in their opportunities to 
benefit from one or at most two of these sources. Fagerberg reviews many of these studies and 
concludes, “probably, the estimation of a single-equation model –with GDP per capita and other 
variables included- is an activity to which there are now sharply diminishing returns” (Fagerberg, 
1994, p. 1171). This quote could be read as a plea for more empirical work that takes 
simultaneous interactions between important variables into account. In our view, a similar 
argument applies to theoretical models. We think that a model that presents a more unified 
framework is asked for, because many complications blur the comparability of the major lessons 
to be learnt from more partial models.     
One of the complications is that outcomes often differ due to particular choices concerning 
the level of aggregation. This holds for both theoretical and empirical studies. For instance, 
studies for single sectors mostly yield different outcomes than studies that suppose that 
economies consist of one commodity market. Differences between sectors with regard to their 
technological progress from whatever source and changes of the sectoral structure can together 
have important effects on aggregate productivity growth rates. Baumol’s disease (Baumol, 1967) 
illustrates this issue quite convincingly. 
Further, results are likely to be affected by the perspective chosen with respect to international 
trade. Especially the effects of learning-by-doing could well be highly dependent on the export 
performance of countries. Moreover, the international competitiveness of a country’s products is 
generally thought to be affected by this country’s technological standards vis-à-vis its rivals. 
Consequently, a process of virtuous (or vicious) circles emerges, which also affects the sectoral 
structure. Thus, studies in which countries are seen as parts of an international system of 
2interdependent countries are likely to yield different outcomes than studies that consider 
countries as autarkic entities. 
In this paper, we propose a very general model. It describes the evolution of a system of two 
trading economies that consist of multiple sectors. The productivity growth rates of sectors, as 
well as the specialization patterns of countries, are the outcome of the interplay between 
innovation, catching-up and learning-by-doing. We will present outcomes of the model for a 
rather comprehensive set of parameter values that indicate the relative strength of these sources 
of technological progress. This allows us to draw some broad conclusions about the 
characteristics (in terms of parameter values) of technological progress for which aggregate labor 
productivity levels of countries tend to be relatively equal and to describe the corresponding 
specialization patterns. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will discuss the sources of 
productivity growth and their impact on the convergence process according to several growth 
theories. Special attention will be devoted to the interactions of these sources with changes in the 
sectoral structure and international trade. Sections 3 and 4 deal with the model equations. In 
Section 5, we will analyze the behavior of the model, mainly by means of simulation analysis. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Growth and technology: theoretical perspectives 
 
Most economists will agree that in the long run, technology is one of the main drivers of 
economic growth. The relationship between growth and technology, however, takes many 
different forms and can hardly be envisaged as a simple process that is steady through time. 
Looking at the literature on growth and technology, one may distinguish four main ways in which 
technology and innovation have their impact on growth. 
The first, and perhaps simplest, way is found in the traditional neo-classical way of considering 
the growth process. This views economic growth as a steady-state process in which GDP per 
capita grows at a fixed rate over time. This rate, which is equal to the rate of technological 
progress, may be exogenously determined, as it was in the first version of the model (Solow, 
1956). In the more recent so-called endogenous growth theory, (e.g. Romer, 1986, and Lucas, 
1988) the rate of productivity growth is determined endogenously through, for example, research 
and development efforts. Viewed from this perspective, the answer to the question “why growth 
rates differ” can take two forms. The first answer argues about differences in the steady states 
between countries. For the old (Solow) model, this poses a logical difficulty, especially in relation 
to the assumption that knowledge and technology are public goods, which are freely available for 
all countries in the world. Under this assumption, differences in the steady state between 
countries cannot exist. The new growth models solve this logical difficulty by modeling the 
steady state growth rate itself as a function of economic variables, such as, for example, the 
3amount of human capital available in a country. In this case, individual countries converge to 
their own steady state, which will generally differ from that of other countries. 
The neoclassical approach offers a second explanation of different productivity growth rates. 
Countries may not be on their steady state growth path, but may instead be converging to it. 
Thus, both below and above steady state growth rates are possible, depending on which side of 
the steady state the country starts from. Traditionally, the capital labor ratio has been taken as an 
indication of this, where the natural path for a country is to start from a relatively low capital 
labor ratio. This is associated to high growth rates through the mechanism of decreasing marginal 
returns. The speed of the convergence process towards the steady state has been the subject of a 
recent debate, in which the overall conclusion seems to be that this speed is rather low (e.g., 
Mankiw, Romer & Weil, 1992). Thus, on any practical time scale (say, decades), convergence may 
be a more dominant factor behind growth rate differentials than differences in steady states. 
The idea of convergence is also the crucial factor in the second notion of technological change 
found in the literature. This is the literature that builds on the arguments of Gerschenkron (1962) 
and Abramovitz (1979), and to which we will refer as the catching-up literature. The main idea is 
that technological knowledge may diffuse from advanced countries to less advanced countries, 
i.e., that relatively backward countries may learn from more advanced countries. This view is 
inspired by the notion that knowledge is to a certain degree a public good. Imitating may be 
cheaper than developing brand new knowledge. In this way, there is actually an advantage to 
being relatively backward, because rapid growth may be achieved at lower costs.1 
The main line of argument in the catching-up literature is quite different from the neoclassical 
perspective. The difference lies in the degree to which it is assumed that knowledge is actually a 
public good. The argument in the catching-up literature is that in order to benefit from a catch-
up bonus, several conditions need to be fulfilled. Abramovitz (1979) has labeled these conditions 
“social capability” and “technological congruence”. Social capability refers to the notion that in 
order to apply knowledge developed in a more advanced country, the catching-up country needs 
certain skills, equipment or institutions. Social capability is thus a broad concept that includes 
widely differing factors such as a stable financial system, a sufficient level of human capital, a 
sufficient level of infrastructure (transport, power generation), and so on. Without sufficient 
social capability, falling behind may be a more realistic outcome than catching-up.  
The second prerequisite for catching-up identified by Abramovitz is technological congruence. 
This refers to the notion that technologies developed in advanced countries may not always be 
appropriate for less advanced countries. An important factor in this is the sectoral structure of 
the economy. For example, many less advanced economies depend to a large extent on 
agriculture, while technologies developed by advanced countries may be aimed at other sectors 
such as high-tech manufacturing. Catching-up then becomes more than just applying foreign 
1  If the level of technological knowledge is related somehow to the capital labor ratio (e.g., technological knowledge is 
embodied in machines, or through a technical progress function as in Kaldor, 1957), the neoclassical story of convergence 
may be observationally equivalent to this catching-up effect.  
4technology, and issues like cross-sectoral transfer of resources enter the picture. Again, the 
conclusion is that with a lack of technological congruence, falling behind is the realistic outcome. 
The third source of technological change that we will discuss can be characterized as learning-
by-doing or cumulative learning. This is an important topic both in the early literature (e.g., 
Verdoorn, 1949, Arrow, 1962) and some of the new growth models (e.g., Young, 1991).2 
Technological change is generated as a result of experience in production or use. Such a 
mechanism generates positive feedback, i.e., high rates of technological progress result from high 
activity levels, or high growth of activity levels. A variety of mechanisms can be used to explain 
this phenomenon at the microeconomic level. Most of these explanations argue that ideas and 
procedures for small (incremental) innovations related to implementation may emerge as a result 
of using a technology. Although every single incremental innovation may be small, their joint 
cumulative effect is often large, as is for example shown in the historical studies of Habakkuk 
(1962). 
The consequences of cumulative learning run against convergence. If using a technology 
enhances learning, the ones who are most successful at this will also learn most. That is, success 
breeds success. This implies a tendency for divergence of technology levels between countries, 
rather than convergence. Kaldor (1966) and Dixon & Thirlwall (1975) use this argument to make 
a point about persistence of growth rate differentials between regions. In a similar fashion, Lucas 
(1988) presents a model about persistence of growth rate differentials between countries. 
The final view on the role of technology in economic growth is the structural view. Here it is 
argued that there are important differences between sectors in terms of technology. These 
differences may be directly related to technology, through variables such as technological 
opportunity or age of the technology. But also more indirect variables, such as income elasticities 
may play a role here, although only in combination with the more direct differences in technology 
between sectors. If sectors are characterized by different rates of productivity growth, or by 
different rates of demand growth (through, for example income elasticities), economic structure 
becomes important for aggregate economic growth. This is a topic that is mostly explored in the 
post-Keynesian literature, such as Pasinetti (1981) and Thirlwall (1979). Whereas Pasinetti (1981) 
considers this topic mostly in the context of a closed economy, Thirlwall (1979) brings in foreign 
demand. In the latter approach, the composition of exports and imports, and especially their 
respective income elasticities determine the growth potential of nations through balance-of-
payments constraints. 
Each of these different ways of looking at economic growth and technology has its own 
internal logic, as well as empirical support. Between some of the approaches, there are obvious 
links, such as, for example, the notion of technological congruence from the catch-up literature 
and the structural view of the growth process, or between the neo-classical argument about 
2  Interestingly, cumulative learning plays an important role in both neoclassical-oriented growth models and in more 
‘heterodox’ contributions, for example the Post-Keynesian literature on growth.  
5convergence and the idea of catching-up. But still, it is fair to say that major differences of insight 
remain. These differences relate to fundamental questions like whether convergence or 
divergence is the natural outcome of the growth process, or, more broadly, what is behind 
empirically observed growth rate differentials. 
The model developed in this paper is able to unite all the different views on the technology – 
economic growth relationship that were briefly discussed in this section. This model will be used 
to analyze how the mix of relative importance of the various mechanisms will affect the 
likelihood of convergence or divergence between countries in terms of their productivity levels. 
Thus our model will take the form of a generic skeleton that encompasses both the steady state 
view of economic growth and the structural view on economic growth. On top of this skeleton, 
three different forms of technological change may be imposed: an (exogenous) steady state 
exponential growth rate of productivity, international technology diffusion between sectors 
potentially leading to catching-up, and productivity growth in the form of cumulative learning. 
 
 
3. Model Description: Short-run Equations 
 
In order to keep the model relatively simple, we abstract from any other production factor than 
labor and further assume that commodities are produced for consumption purposes only.3 The 
world economy consists of two countries, called North (N) and South (S). In this world, n 
commodities are produced. Both countries are assumed to be able to produce all commodities, 
but nothing precludes a situation in which some of the commodities appear to be produced in 
just one country. The characteristics of a specific commodity are assumed to be independent of 
its country of origin. Consumption demand can be met by domestically produced and/or by 
imported commodities.  
In each period, the output and employment levels for both countries are the result of the 
interplay of a number of state variables, presented in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: State variables. 
1. cSi
c
Ni ll ,    (i=1,...,n) labor requirements per unit of output 
2. SiNi zz ,   (i=1,...,n) shares of domestically produced consumption 
goods in consumption demand.  
3. SiNi bb ,    (i=1,...,n;  == 1,1 SiNi bb ) shares of commodities in aggregate 
consumption 
4. SiNi pp ,   (i=1,...,n) commodity prices 
  Note: indices N and S refer to North and South, respectively. 
The first set of state variables represents the technologies in use. The variables indicate the 
physical amounts of labor required to produce physical units of output, in each of the industries 
3 See Los & Verspagen (2000) for a more elaborate model with intermediate input structures. In a qualitative sense, all 
conclusions are robust to the inclusion of input-output relations between sectors. 
6in North and South. Labor is supposed to be homogeneous, in the sense that workers can 
immediately and freely move from one industry to another. On the other hand, we assume that 
labor is immobile in a geographical sense, i.e. that workers do not migrate from North to South 
or vice versa. The second set of variables indicates the fractions of domestically produced 
outputs in consumption, for each of the commodities and for both countries. The third set 
reflects the preferences of consumers in both countries. These variables are defined as the shares 
of total consumption in a country devoted to a particular good, measured in constant prices. 
Finally, the fourth set of state variables indicates the prices of the goods, expressed in a common 
currency. 
The balance of payments plays an important role in our model. Arbitrary consumption vectors 
would only by chance yield a balance-of-payments (current account) equilibrium. As McCombie 
& Thirlwall (1994) argue, nothing prevents a country from being caught in a situation of current 
account deficits for a short time. In the long run, however, such a state of affairs is unsustainable 
unless capital inflows keep coming in infinitely and in steadily increasing amounts. Moreover, 
infinitely cumulating stocks of Southern (Northern) currency would not improve North’s 
(South’s) welfare. 
Following Thirlwall (1979) and Verspagen (2001), we assume that total consumption levels in 
North and South must always correspond to balance-of-payments equilibrium. As we consider a 
closed system without exports and imports to and from third countries, we could write North’s 
current account surplus (or deficit) as the difference between the value of the goods imported by 
South and the value of goods imported by North (see McCombie, 1993, for a similar approach). 
Hence, current account equilibrium prevails if and only if the following holds: 
 










11 ,       (1) 
 
in which fN and fS denote the total consumption levels (in constant prices) in North and South, 
respectively. This equation can be rewritten in a way that expresses the current account-
equilibrium consumption level in South in some of the state variables in Table 1 and the level of 
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Equation (2) shows that the solutions that represent current account equilibrium together 
constitute a line in the plane fN - fS. Since prices and consumption shares are always positive and 
trade shares cannot exceed 1, the slope of the line is positive. The interpretation of this result is 
7rather straightforward. Increased consumption in North induces more imports from South, 
which enables South to import more from North. Given current account equilibrium, these 
imports increase South’s consumption. The value of the slope depends on the relative prices 
(exporting a cheap good does not earn much money for South to import expensive goods from 
North), the trade shares (South does not gain much in terms of consumption from increased 
Northern consumption if North produces its own goods, or if South imports virtually everything) 
and the consumption shares (South does not gain much by exporting a good that is hardly 
demanded by North). 
In order to determine a unique short-run solution for fN and fS, (i.e., to choose a specific point 
on the current account equilibrium line) we have to impose an additional equation. We assume 
that one of the countries is constrained by available labor resources. In each period, either 
employment in North equals its labor supply ( supNl ) or employment in South equals its labor 
supply ( supSl ), depending on which country reaches its constraint first. Labor supply is exogenous 
in every period. Since trade implies that employment levels in North do not only depend on 
North’s own consumption but also on consumption in South (and vice versa), the full employment 
assumptions yield another two relations between the two total consumption levels Sf  and Nf . 











sup 1        (3) 
 
This expression can be rewritten as 
 





























































    (4) 
 
Since both the numerator and the denominator of the slope coefficient are positive, the line 
described by equation (4) is downward sloping. If the consumption level in North would be 
reduced, the consumption level in South would have to increase in order to keep the Northern 
labor previously employed in the production of domestically demanded output at work. The 
slope itself is determined by productivity coefficients, trade coefficients and consumer 
preferences. Analogously, we can find a relation corresponding to full employment in South: 
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8 
Solving equations (2) and (4) yields the situation in which North’s consumption is both balance-
























=      (6) 
   
Of course, we can also find the intersection of the upward sloping balance-of-payments line (2) 
and the downward sloping line (5), which corresponds to resources and balance-of-payments 
























=      (7) 
    
The short-run equilibrium point in the ( SN ff , )-plane is now defined as the minimum of the 
points given by equations (6) and (7), since one country would produce above its capacity in the 
other intersection point. Given these consumption levels and their composition with regard to 
industries and countries of origin, the output levels and its sectoral compositions in North and 
South can be determined for the period under consideration: 
 
( ) SSiSiNNiNiNi fbzfbzq −+= 1     and   ( ) SSiSiNNiNiSi fbzfbzq +−= 1  (i=1,...,n) (8) 
 
Finally, commodity-specific prices (expressed in a common currency, assuming an exchange rate 
which is known at the beginning of each period) are assumed to reflect labor costs:  
 
c
NiNNi lwp =  and   
c
SiSSi lxwp =  (i=1,...,n)      (9) 
 
The symbols wN and wS denote the nominal wage rates (in North and South, expressed in the 
national currencies), which we assume to be given at the beginning of each period. The exchange 
rate (also given at the beginning of each period) is denoted by x. This implies that we adopt the 
rule to express both Northern and Southern prices in Northern currency. 
The short-run model we introduced in this section yields output and employment levels by 
industry and country, as well as consumption levels for each of the commodities produced in 
North and South. These levels are completely determined by the production technologies, trade 
relations, consumer preferences, labor supply, prices, the exchange rate and the nominal wage 
rates prevailing during a period. Since we are primarily interested in the long-run dynamics of the 
9endogenous variables mentioned, we now turn to the specification of the equations that describe 
the intertemporal behavior of the variables that we have assumed so far to be fully exogenous.      
 
 
4. Model Description: Intertemporal Relations 
 
In this section we present the intertemporal equations that allow us to study long-run issues like 
output growth, convergence and structural change. Unlike the previous section, this section does 
not include the derivation of solutions. Due to the mathematical complexity caused by our 
explicit focus on economies consisting of multiple industries, analytical solutions are hard to 
derive. We will first deal with the equations describing technological progress and subsequently 
discuss the relations we specified with regard to trade share dynamics and exchange rate 
movements.  
 
4.a Technology Dynamics  
Following our earlier intersectoral models of technological change (Los, 2001, and Verspagen, 
2001), we model innovation as changes of input coefficients. We define the (industry-specific) 
rates of technological progress as the proportional changes of the inverses of the cl  coefficients, 





Ni +γ=+      and    ][]1[]1[ tlttl cSiSicSi +γ=+     (10) 
  
We allow both for differences in productivity growth rates between industries and between 
countries. Following the catching-up literature discussed in Section 2, we model two regimes. In 
the first regime, the industry under consideration has lower labor requirements per unit of output 
than its foreign competitor. In this case, we call the industry in this country the leader industry, 
and the corresponding industry in the other country the lagging industry. 
We assume that leader industries experience technological progress through two mechanisms. 
First, a constant exogenous productivity growth rate is assumed, which reflects the laborsaving 
effects of innovation.4 This reflects the (neo-classical) idea of steady state growth at a fixed rate. 
Second, a mechanism that we label the Kaldor-Verdoorn mechanism represents cumulative 
learning: if the output of an industry grows, it is assumed that learning-by-doing and 
opportunities for specialization of workers lead to increased productivity.  
In the lagging-behind regime, we assume that the Kaldor-Verdoorn mechanism is still 
functioning, but that the steady-state fixed rate of technological progress is absent. In other 
words, we assume that this source of technological progress is generated only by the leading 
4 For simplicity, we do not include stochastic arrivals of innovations, nor do we incorporate explicit search for innovations 
(R&D) in the model. See Los (2001) for an intersectoral model with R&D and stochastic innovation in a single-country 
context.  
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country, as would be consistent with an endogenous growth model in which R&D can only be 
performed by the advanced firms. Instead, in the lagging country, the technological gap to the 
leader industry is assumed to give opportunities for catching-up, for instance by imitation of the 
competitor’s production technology.  
Summarizing, the reductions in labor coefficients under the two regimes can be represented 
by 
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  (12) 
 
in which κ (>0), σ (>1), ρ (>0) and α (0<α<1) are industry-specific parameters and *cil indicates 
the unit labor requirements in the corresponding leader industry. κ and σ relate to the Kaldor-
Verdoorn mechanism taken from Verspagen (1993) and reflect the rate of dynamic learning. The 
mechanism brings a positive feedback into the dynamic model, since high output growth leads to 
high productivity growth (although at a decreasing marginal rate). ρ is the steady-state rate of 
technological progress in the leading industry, α reflects the catching-up mechanism in the 
lagging country. The larger the productivity gap in terms of labor inputs per unit of gross output, 
the more the laggard industry will catch up. The value of α is assumed to reflect social capability, 
which means this is taken as an exogenous factor. Note, however, that our multi-industry 
specification implicitly takes account of the fact that incompatibility of output structures plays an 
important role, i.e., technological congruence is endogenous. For example, if South would lag 
North in one industry but produces only a very small part of its output in this industry, aggregate 
labor productivity would not benefit much from this industry-specific technology gap. 
 
4.b Trade share dynamics 
Trade share dynamics are assumed to be ruled by changes in relative competitiveness. According 
to traditional theory, the competitiveness of countries is determined by costs per unit of output. 
In such a situation, the interplay of two developments would determine changes in a country’s 
competitiveness: reductions in the amounts of labor required per unit of output and changes in 
the relative wage rates.5 These factors are summarized by prices (equation 9), so that we assume 
5 These unit labor costs are generally converted to a common currency. Hence, exchange rate changes may alter the 
competitiveness structure as well.  
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that changes in a country’s shares on the world markets are dependent on price differentials 
(only). 
To determine the commodity-specific trade shares, we use the concept of an inverted logistic 
curve, as illustrated in Figure 1. In mathematical terms, this relation between the price ratio and 












































1     (13) 
 
The parameter ε can be interpreted as the value of the logarithm of the price ratio for which the 
market shares are equally divided. For perfectly tradable goods this parameter will equal zero, but 
for most goods the price ratio corresponding to equal market shares will have a positive value. In 
this case, the market shares of domestically produced inputs will be larger than fifty percent when 
prices are equal. The extent to which the market share at the unit price ratio differs from fifty 
percent is also dependent on the parameter ϕ(>0), which represents the commodity-specific 
sensitivity of trade shares to changes in the price ratio. The lower ϕ, the more sensitive the trade 
shares are. The parameters ϕ may be affected by a number of things, such as costs of 




Trade shares are not assumed to adjust immediately to changes in prices. We model an 
adjustment process, in which the gap between the actual trade shares z and the equilibrium trade 
shares z* vanish gradually in the absence of shocks: 
 
( )]1[][][]1[ * +−η−=+ tztztztz t           (14) 
 
with ηt (0<ηt<1) denoting the speed of adjustment. 
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4.c Wage rates, the exchange rate and remaining variables
The two country-specific nominal wage rates are assumed to be constant, at least if expressed in 
national currencies. When technological progress reduces the unit labor requirements, prices will 
consequently be reduced and the real wage rate will grow. One caveat applies, however. In a 
system of flexible exchange rates, the purchasing power of a given amount of Northern currency 
relative to an identical amount of Southern currency may change. 
In the modeling of exchange rate dynamics we use a specification similar to that of trade 
shares. The exchange rate is a weighted average of the actual rate and an equilibrium rate based 
on purchasing power parity of the two currencies: 
 
( )]1[][][]1[ * +−η−=+ txtxtxtx x         (15)  
 
The smaller xη (0≤ xη ≤1), the more a system of fixed exchange rates is approximated. x* is 


























]1[         (16) 
 
The superindices nat indicate prices expressed in national currencies. 
Finally, we assume that the consumption shares of the sectors are fixed in each country. 
Moreover, we assume that these variables do not differ between countries. Thus, consumer 
preferences are assumed to be identical.6 
 
 
5. Model Analysis 
 
As mentioned earlier, the long-run behavior of the two national economies in our model can best 
be studied by means of simulation analysis. Before we turn to a discussion of some of the 
simulation results we obtained, we illustrate the basic effects of an innovation by a diagram that 
depicts some highly simplified comparative statics. 
In Figure 2, the axes indicate the total consumption levels for North and South. The solid 
upward sloping line (I) reflects all pairs of consumption levels for which the balance of payments 
is in equilibrium in the initial situation, see equation (7). The downward sloping solid lines (IIN 
and IIS) indicate all pairs of consumption levels for which full employment initially prevails in 
North and in South, respectively, see equations (10) and (11). The slopes of these lines will 
generally differ, e.g. due to different compositions of consumption bundles with respect to 
6  Los & Verspagen (2000) study the consequences of income-specific consumer preferences for productivity growth 
differentials, by means of a model that resembles the one introduced here. 
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F
countries of origin. In the situation depicted, consumption levels are given by the intersection 
point F, in which North experiences full employment and South faces excess labor supply. 
 
 
Figure 2: Consumption effects of innovation. 
 
Now, suppose that North generates a labor saving innovation. Consequently, the labor constraint 
will be less tight, and for given consumption levels in North higher consumption levels in South 
are attainable, since more ‘effective’ labor is available to produce exports. This is reflected by the 
upward shift of the Northern full employment line (see dashed line II’N). In general, the slope will 
change as well, but the sign of this change depends on the interplay of many parameter values. 
Nevertheless, the ‘first order’ effect of technological progress in the labor-constrained country is 
an increase in both North’s and South’s consumption levels. 
The supposed innovation in North also has some ‘second order’ effects. The net effects of 
these are ambiguous, as will become clear after studying the dashed lines I’ and I”. The lines 
represent two important opposite effects. First, innovation yields a lower price per unit of output 
for North. This implies that for a given amount of exports, North can buy fewer imports and 
must reduce its consumption, while South can increase its import volume at constant costs (I’). 
This is a terms-of-trade effect. Second, North’s reduced price enhances its competitiveness 
relative to South, which will cause higher market shares. Consequently, innovating North requires 
fewer imports per unit of output, which enables it to produce more consumption goods. For 
South the opposite holds and its attainable consumption level will fall. This effect is documented 
by curve I”.
Which of the two second-order effects dominates depends on a number of parameters and 
variables, of which the sensitivity of market shares to price changes is an important one. The 
bottom line of this simple comparative statics analysis is that it is impossible to tell in advance 
which effect will dominate, and hence what the ultimate effect of an innovation on relative 











The interplay between the various forms of technological progress in the model may also yield 
rather interesting effects. Especially the combination of the Kaldor-Verdoorn and catching-up 
effects is noteworthy. Since this mechanism, which we dub as the ‘catching-up-cumulative-
learning cycle’ is rather crucial for the overall analysis of the model, we discuss it here in some 
detail. Note that the ‘catching-up-cumulative-learning cycle’ is in some respects similar to the 
properties of the model proposed by Landesmann & Stehrer (2000). 
 
 
Figure 3: The ‘catching-up-cumulative-learning cycle’ 
  
A typical situation is depicted in Figure 3. The vertical axis of the upper diagram indicates the so-
called technology gap, which is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between the labor 
requirements per unit of output in a Northern industry to such requirements in its Southern 
counterpart. Hence, a negative value points towards a technological advantage of a Northern 
industry. In the lower panel, the shares of North and South in the world production of the two 
goods are indicated on the vertical axis (e.g., SH-N1 stands for the share of North in the world 
production of good 1). 
The most prominent phenomenon emerging from Figure 3 is that so-called ‘taking-over’ 
occurs at the level of industries: initially each country is leader in either one of the industries, but 
after an interval of about 65 periods the leadership pattern is reversed. This taking-over happens 
almost simultaneously in both industries. Specialization patterns also evolve in a cyclical fashion. 
What drives these cycles? 
 
Technology Gaps by Industry 
 
 
Specialization Patterns by Product 
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The catch-up part of the dynamics consists of technological imitation that drives the 
technology gap towards an equilibrium value. It is important to note that this equilibrium value 
can change endogenously over the simulation, and this is exactly what happens when the 
technology gaps alternate between positive and negative ‘attractors’. Whether the equilibrium 
value is positive or negative depends on ρ and the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect. The first of these two 
factors (ρ) always gives the leading country an advantage, since ρ=0 in the lagging country.  
At the upper turning point of either one of the technology gaps in Figure 3, the lagging 
country has been experiencing a fall of its market share, because the increasing gap has led to a 
competitive disadvantage of the lagging country. The technology gap approaches a short-run 
equilibrium value, because the catch-up bonus increases, and thus offsets the effect due to ρ and 
Kaldor-Verdoorn. Because the technology gap now stops growing, the trend of a declining 
market share also stops. The laggard is now able to benefit from the generally expanding world 
market and realize positive production growth. This sets in motion the Kaldor-Verdoorn learning 
effect. A slowdown of production growth in the leading country is induced because the lagging 
country captures more of the market. Through the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect, this induces a 
slowdown of the rate of productivity growth in the leading country. This changes the short-run 
equilibrium value of the technology gap, which becomes smaller. The result is that the gap now 
starts to decline.  
When the gap becomes zero, the catching-up bonus disappears, but now the country becomes 
the leading country, and the effect due to a positive ρ sets in. The other (formerly leading) 
country now loses the bonus due to ρ, but starts to experience a catch-up bonus. In Figure 3, the 
parameter values have been chosen such that the technology gap actually reverses sign, but with 
different parameter values, this does not need to happen. In particular, for higher values of ρ, the 
leader country has such a strong advantage that the gap does not reverse sign, and the lower 
turning point occurs on the same side of the horizontal zero-level as the upper turning point. At 
the lower turning point, the same logic as for the upper turning point applies, hut now with the 
roles (leader or laggard) of the two countries reversed. The dynamics are symmetric.  
In order to get insight into the behavior of the model beyond these simple comparative statics, 
we resort to simulation analysis. We concentrate on the set of parameters related to technological 
progress, i.e. ρ, κ, σ and α. The number of sectors is set to two in all simulations. To keep the 
analysis as tractable as possible, we choose our basic parameter configuration in a way that both 
goods and both countries are (initially) as similar as possible. Exact parameter values are 
documented in an appendix, which shows that the production processes of both goods in North 
and South are initially the same, except for a very small difference in labor requirements to induce 
differences between the two countries in terms of the regimes of technological progress. Each 
country is assumed to be the technological leader in one industry. Initial trade shares are all equal. 
The only difference between sectors lies in the consumption shares: good 1 is consumed four 
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times as much as good 2. With respect to the other parameters that govern the dynamic 
processes, the two goods are perfectly identical. 
The main variable that we are interested in is the aggregate level of inequality between 
countries, which we measure as the absolute value of the logarithm of the ratio between the 
macroeconomic labor productivity levels in North and South, averaged over the simulation 
period of a single run. All results are based on 250 periods, of which the first 100 were not used 
because they show traces of the choice of initial conditions. To illustrate some of the general 
tendencies of the model, we show in Figure 4 the results for a range of values of ρ, while 
simultaneously switching on or off the other forms of technological progress. In the figure, the 
inequality indicator is depicted on the vertical axis (higher values indicate more inequality). Values 
on the horizontal axis denote the value of ρ. The values for σ and α are 6.0 and 0.2, respectively. 
We pick the value of κ such that the Kaldor-Verdoorn mechanism yields a 1% growth rate of 
labor productivity for a growth rate of production equal to 1%. 
 
 













The figure contains four lines. The first one is denoted by “none”, which indicates that both the 
catch-up parameters and the growth rate implied by the Kaldor-Verdoorn mechanism 
(cumulative learning) are set equal to zero. We see that this curve rises steeply in the segment of 
very low rates of technological progress in the leading industries, reaches a maximum average 
aggregate technology gap for ρ=0.001 and approaches zero for larger values of ρ. This tendency 
towards zero is perhaps easiest to grasp. South is the leader in industry 1 and will thus also 
innovate in this industry. North is the leader and innovator in industry 2. Without any other ways 
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of productivity increase, there is no way for the follower to catch-up to the leader, and the price 
gap between the two countries for each good will grow. Complete specialization is the result. 
Since both the rates of technological progress and the initial labor productivity levels are equal 
for both industries in this set of simulations, this will lead to equal macroeconomic levels of labor 
productivity.7  
However, at low rates of innovation, we see the level of disparity between the countries rising 
with ρ. The reason for this is that specialization is less pronounced in this case, and both 
countries remain active in the industry in which they have a competitive disadvantage. This most 
heavily affects North, since it attracts the same share of the world production of good 1 as South 
attracts of the world production of good 2, but the market for good 1 is much larger. 
Consequently, more labor is allocated to low-productivity activities in North. This effect is 
obviously absent for ρ=0, but increases for small positive values of ρ. This is reflected in the 
rising trend of disparity. When complete specialization starts to emerge, the curve peaks and 
starts to fall towards zero in the way already described. 
Introduction of the Kaldor-Verdoorn cumulative causation mechanism (line “KV”) leaves 
these dynamics essentially unchanged, but increases the intensity. Specialization in an industry 
causes output growth, which in turn leads to productivity growth and even more specialization. If 
the annual long-run growth rate implied by the Kaldor-Verdoorn mechanism is set at 0.01, very 
low levels of ρ (in the order of magnitude of 0.001) are already sufficient to reach almost full 
specialization before period 100. Hence the “KV” line jumps up immediately after ρ=0, but falls 
directly after that. 
With only technological imitation of leaders by laggards being present, the nature of the 
dynamics is again similar (the “alfa”-line). A positive rate of innovation for leaders and a positive 
rate of catch-up for laggards imply convergence towards a constant technology gap, and therefore 
a constant degree of specialization. The higher ρ for the given value of α, the stronger is the 
long-run degree of specialization. Hence, for high values of ρ, specialization is almost complete 
and both countries perform equally well according to the macroeconomic labor productivity 
yardstick. For low ρ, we observe the same kind of dynamics as was seen for the “none” line. 
Now, however, labor productivity levels of both industries in a country deviate much less, 
because of the tendency to converge to a fixed gap. Hence incomplete specialization is relatively 
harmless in terms of aggregate technology gaps. This is why the upward-sloping part of the curve 
covers a wider span of ρ.  
The by far most dramatic effects of changes in the rate of innovation in the leading industries 
are found if Kaldor-Verdoorn effects and abilities to catch-up are simultaneously taken into 
account (line “alfa+KV”). In this case, the type of dynamics that was described in the discussion 
of Figure 3 start to play a role. In particular, the steep rise and decline of labor productivity 
7 It should be noted that this does not lead to equal GDP levels: the unequal consumption shares cause unemployment in the 
country that produces the good that is relatively unpopular with the consumers.  
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differentials in the range of ρs after the value ρ=0.009 deserves special attention. It turns out that 
this sudden change of behavior of the aggregate productivity gap is due to a qualitative change in 
the ‘catching-up-cumulative-learning cycle’.  
To the left of the point ρ=0.009, the ‘catching-up-cumulative-learning cycle’ unfolds as in 
Figure 3, i.e., leadership periodically switches between the countries and the sign of the 
technology gaps reverses. The amplitude of the technology gap cycles is relatively small, i.e., the 
upper and lower turner points occur at relatively small (absolute) values of the gaps. 
Specialization patterns co-evolve with the technology gaps, and this yields inequality as described 
in the discussion of Figure 3. 
To the right of the ‘bifurcation point’ at ρ=0.009, the technology gaps no longer change signs, 
and technological leadership always remains with one country. This is due to the fact that the 
bonus for the technological leader (ρ) is now so high that it prevents taking-over. As a result, 
trade specialization does not change sign over time, and this leads to a higher aggregate 
productivity gap because it is now always just one of the countries benefiting from the larger 
market for good 1. In fact, at values of ρ just slightly larger than 0.009, the technology gaps 
converge to an equilibrium value that corresponds to a fixed trade specialization pattern. 
The sharp drop in the “alfa+KV” line at ρ=0.011 corresponds to a situation in which South is 
the technological leader in both sectors. The technology gap for North is equal in the two 
sectors, and hence no specialization occurs: the share of North (South) in both sectors is equal to 
each other. Specialization does not induce inequality in this case. To the right of the point 
ρ=0.011, the behavior of the model does not change in a qualitative sense. Specialization 
becomes more pronounced, however, and hence inequality grows.  
Around the point ρ=0.022, specialization becomes almost complete in both sectors. The 
tendency for the equilibrium technology gaps to grow does not stop, due to the increasing ρ. 
Consequently, prices between the two countries keep diverging. Because of the complete 
specialization, the trade shares of both countries for the goods in which they are specialized 
cannot grow further, and the only effect of the price differentials is on the terms of trade. In 
terms of the discussion of Figure 2 above, this means that one of the two second-order effects 
(associated to a shift of the balance-of-payments-restriction line in Figure 2) disappears. This 
causes more equality, which is reflected the huge drop of the “alfa+KV”-curve in Figure 4 for 
innovation rate values that exceed ρ=0.024. For very high values of ρ, the “alfa+KV”-curve and 
the “alfa”-curve coincide, which reflects that the strong effects of exogenous innovations 
dominate the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect. 
The point of the model is not so much to explain specific figures like Figure 4. After all, by 
choosing different values of the parameters, or even by plotting values of a different parameter 
on the horizontal axis, it would be possible to generate quite different figures. Thus, Figure 4 
should only be considered as an illustration of the type of mechanisms that exist in the model, 
19
and the way they interact. In order to paint a broader picture of the range of possible outcomes, 
we proceed to vary the technological change parameters in a systematic way against each other. 
In Figure 5, we plot the macroeconomic productivity gap indicator that featured in Figure 5 
against two technology-related parameters, the innovation parameter ρ and the catch-up 
parameter α. The Kaldor-Verdoorn parameter σ is held constant at 3.0. Dark (light) regions 
indicate parameter configurations for which the inequality indicator is high (low). The picture 
looks rather chaotic for some ranges of parameter values, but some tendencies emerge 
immediately. For very low values of ρ and very high values of α, the gaps are small. This is due to 
the well-known logic from technology-gap theories of growth that equilibrium gaps are low for 
such parameter configurations. The macroeconomic gap is thus small in both sectors.  
 
 
Figure 5: Joint effects of innovation and catch-up on productivity gaps   
 
 
At first sight, the finding that the gaps are small for the opposite configuration, in which 
exogenous innovation is high and catching-up is virtually absent, may appear less straightforward. 
In this case, complete specialization prevails. Further, the terms-of-trade effect discussed with 
respect to the right-hand-side range of ρ-values in Figure 4 applies. The diagonally oriented 
combinations of ρ and α values that produce large productivity gaps correspond to the situation 
in which sectoral gaps are large but specialization is not yet complete. The steep decline “to the 
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southeast” also corresponds to the steep decline found in Figure 4. Finally, no clear-cut pattern 
can be detected for the range characterized by low values of ρ and low to medium values of α. 
This is partly due to the presence of situations in which one country becomes the productivity 
leader in both sectors and specialization hardly occurs (note in particular the “narrow valley” for 
ρs approximately equal to 0.02 and αs higher than about 0.15).   
The relationship between the aggregate productivity gap on the one hand and the innovation 
rate ρ and cumulative learning mechanism σ on the other is depicted in Figure 6. The value of 
the catching-up parameter α is held constant at 0.2. 
  
 
Figure 6: Joint effects of innovation and learning-by-doing on productivity gaps 
 
For very low values of σ, the aggregate productivity gap is huge (note the difference in the 
indicator values associated with a given level of darkness, relative to the Figure 6). This is due to 
the fact that a modest growth of output leads to a substantial increase in productivity in this 
range of σ values. Consequently, the cycles from Figure 3 have much higher amplitudes (sector-
specific gaps will be large) and the frequency of the cycles is much higher. Specialization patterns 
change quickly, but full specialization occurs often. Hence, aggregate productivity gaps change 
sign quite often, but are large in the majority of time periods. This effect is reinforced if ρ takes 
on relatively high values, as is evidenced by the border between the lightest and lightest but one 
shade. 
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For higher values of σ (exceeding 2.5), another interesting phenomenon emerges from the 
figure. Both low and high values of ρ yield small gaps on average, whereas intermediate values 
yield larger gaps. Again, this resembles the hump-shape observed in Figure 4. For low values, 
gaps and specialization patterns behave cyclically and for high values specialization is complete. 
Due to negative terms of trade effects, inequality declines for higher ρ values. The inverse 
relation between ρ and σ that characterizes this “ridge of divergence” is due to the strong 
Kaldor-Verdoorn effect, which promotes cyclical behavior. Thus, for a low value of σ, which 
indicates strong cumulative learning effects, a high exogenous innovation parameter value ρ is 
required to offset this tendency and obtain full specialization.   
 
 
Figure 7: Joint effects of catching-up and learning-by-doing on productivity gaps 
 
Finally, Figure 7 gives an impression of the model’s behavior for combinations of varying 
catching-up parameter α and the learning-by-doing parameter σ. The exogenous innovation rate 
is held constant at 0.025. Like in Figure 6, the productivity inequality is huge for low values of σ. 
Again, this is due to large productivity gaps at the sectoral level and fast reversals of specialization 
patterns. It should be noted, however, that a relatively modest strength of the cumulative learning 
mechanism suffices to generate such patterns for low values of α. This is due to the fact that 
weak capabilities to catch-up yield large short-run equilibrium gaps for a given innovation rate. 
Consequently, leader industries can benefit to a significant extent from learning-by-doing. 
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Another noticeable feature is the “ridge of divergence” that emerges for configurations with 
high values of α and σ. On the left of this ridge, the aggregate gaps are small, due to the terms-
of-trade effects that also cause the drop in Figure 4. For low values of α, sectoral technology 
gaps are large. In this sense, this phenomenon also resembles the northeast region of Figure 6. 
High values of ρ and low values of α both yield large equilibrium technology gaps at the sectoral 
level. On the right hand side of the ridge, catching-up is so strong that technology gaps at the 
sectoral level remain very small. Thus, specialization is far from complete, but because labor 
productivity levels between sectors do not deviate much, this does not have strong effects on 
macroeconomic productivity gaps.  
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
                 
The two-country-two-industry model that was developed in this paper integrates a number of 
well-known partial determinants of economic growth. First, demand-side and supply-side 
mechanisms were merged. The post-Keynesian notion that the rate of export expansion limits 
the attainable output growth rate was combined with the more mainstream argument that output 
growth is determined by the increasing availability of production factors or the growth of their 
productivity. In the model, the latter determines the size of the world markets, whereas the 
former play an important role in the division of the world markets between the two countries. 
A second important integration of well-recognized explanations concerns the sources of 
technological progress. The model distinguishes between two regimes, one in which the industry 
is on the technological frontier, and one in which the industry lags its foreign competitor in terms 
of labor productivity. Both regimes have one source of productivity growth in common: the 
benefits from learning-by-doing, specified as a causal relationship from output growth to 
productivity growth. Further, exogenous productivity growth is present in the leader regime. In 
the laggard regime, the industry can benefit from knowledge that cannot be appropriated by the 
competing industry at the productivity frontier. 
The model is set up in a very general way, so that it can be helpful in analyzing a wide range of 
issues regarding relations between technological change, trade and growth. Consequently, the 
model cannot be solved by analytical means. This paper presented a set of results from 
simulation experiments, of which the focus was on the effects of the three sources of 
technological progress on patterns of convergence in aggregate labor productivity levels and trade 
specialization. The chosen parameter configurations were such that the two sectors we 
distinguish are as identical as possible, with the exception of their share in consumption demand. 
Even then, the simulations showed that small changes in parameter values could have substantial 
effects on the relative performance of the two countries. In particular, in cases in which the three 
sources of technological change were assumed to in operation simultaneously, we found several 
“bifurcation values” that demarcate ranges of parameter values for which sectoral productivity 
growth, structural change and international specialization interact in quite different ways.  
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Our results thus show that the dynamics of catching up (falling behind), innovation and 
learning are far from simple. The parameter space of our model does not have large subspaces in 
which productivity convergence between the countries is simple and automatic. Areas of 
parameter space in which this is the case do exist, but they seem to be only islands in a sea with 
(big) waves of divergence. From this result, we draw two conclusions, one with regard to the 
literature on convergence and divergence of productivity levels, and one with regard to policy. 
With regard to the existing literature, our model is in line with the conclusion (e.g., 
Abramovitz, 1979, Fagerberg, 1994) that convergence is by no means an automatic process that 
will unfold itself as a natural traverse towards a steady state. However, while the existing literature 
mostly reaches this conclusion on the basis of arguments that are mainly related to the 
complexity of technological change as a process (e.g., difficulties associated to imitating foreign 
technology), our model adds to this the complexity of economic structure. The (bi-causal) 
interaction between economic structure and technological change adds complexity to the story, 
but it may also increase the level of empirical reality of the theory, especially if applied to 
countries that are relatively close to each other in terms of the general level of technological 
knowledge. We hope to be able to put (parts of) our model to the empirical test in a future paper. 
With regard to policy, our model suggests that catching-up and convergence of productivity 
levels is not achieved by single issue-oriented approaches. Catching-up is a more complex process 
than just (for example) enhancing social capability or technological congruence. Productivity 
increases (convergence) may be achieved by more than one form of technological change, and 
these interact with the economy in various ways. The outcome of this process may not always be 
as simple as some theories suggest, and finding the right mix of policies may be more a matter of 
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Appendix: Parameter and initial variable configuration 
 
The values below were used to generate the “alfa+KV” line in Figure 4 (and the figures 
thereafter), for various values of ρ1=ρ2. Unless stated otherwise, the documented values refer to 
both North and South, and both to sector 1 and sector 2. 
 
180.0  supl   (labor supply levels) 
0.8  xη   (exchange rate adjustment parameter) 
0.8; 0.2 b1; b2  (consumption shares) 
0.2     α  (speed of catch-up parameters)  
3.0 σ (Kaldor-Verdoorn parameters) 
0.046416 κ (Kaldor-Verdoorn parameters) 8 
0.05     ϕ  (trade share adjustment parameters) 
8 These values of both Kaldor-Verdoorn parameters imply a long-run growth rate of 0.01 per period. Note that Figure 4 was 
generated with σ=6.0. The implied long-run growth rate was maintained at 0.01.   
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0.0 ε (trade share adjustment parameters) 
0.5           ηt  (trade share adjustment parameter) 
160.0; 40.0 q1; q2 (initial output levels) 
200.0 f(-1) (total consumption levels in period -1) 
0.5   t (initial trade shares) 
0.500000; 0.499999   cN
c
N ll 21;   (initial labor requirements in North) 
0.499999; 0.500000 cS
c
S ll 21;  (initial labor requirements in South) 
 
 
